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NON-MORAL EVIL AND THE FREE WILL DEFENSE
Kenneth Boyce
Paradigmatic examples of logical arguments from evil are attempts to estab- 
lish that the following claims are inconsistent with one another: (1) God 
is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good. (2) There is evil in the world. 
Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense resists such arguments by providing a 
positive case that (1) and (2) are consistent. A weakness in Plantinga’s free 
will defense, however, is that it does not show that theism is consistent 
with the proposition that there are non-moral evils in the world (i.e., that 
there obtain morally bad states of affairs for which no creature is morally 
responsible). But many of us firmly believe that there are evils of that sort. 
I show how Plantinga’s free will defense can be extended so as to redress 
this weakness.
Introduction
Paradigmatic examples of logical arguments from evil are attempts to es-
tablish that the following claims are inconsistent with one another:
(1) God is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good.
(2) There is evil in the world.1
Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense resists such arguments by providing 
us with a positive case that (1) and (2) are in fact consistent. It does so 
by arguing that possibly, though God is omnipotent, it is not within his 
power to bring it about that there is moral good but no moral evil.2
A weakness in Plantinga’s free will defense, however, is that (even if 
it is otherwise successful) it does not show that theism is consistent with 
the proposition that there is non-moral evil in the world. That is, it does 
not show that theism is consistent with its being the case that there obtain 
morally bad states of affairs for which no creature is morally responsible.3 
1See J. L. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” Mind 64 (1955): 200–212, for a classic exposi-
tion of this sort of argument.
2See Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Pub-
lishing Company, 1974), 24–64, and Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1974), chap. 9.
3One may take this sentence as a stipulation on my part concerning how I will use the 
term “non-moral evil.” Compare my usage here with Plantinga’s use of the term “broadly 
moral evil” in God, Freedom, and Evil, 59, and The Nature of Necessity, 193.
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But many of us firmly believe that there are evils of that sort.4 Many of us 
(theists and non-theists alike) believe, for just one kind of example, that 
the suffering of sentient beings is intrinsically morally bad and that there 
have been many occasions of animal suffering for which no moral agent 
(other than God, perhaps) is responsible. If God is indeed wholly good, 
why does he not prevent evils of that sort, even if he does need to allow 
some moral evil for the sake of moral good? The free will defense fails to 
show that there is no logical inconsistency here.
In this paper I show how Plantinga’s free will defense can be extended 
so as to redress this weakness. My extension of the free will defense will 
turn on the claim that it is possible that God has what philosophers of 
religion (following the medieval philosopher Luis de Molina) have called 
“middle knowledge.” I will argue that if Plantinga’s original free will de-
fense is successful and it is possible that God has middle knowledge, then 
it is also possible that, though God is omnipotent, it was not within his 
power to bring it about that there is moral good without also actualizing 
a world that contains non-moral evil.
I. A Review of Plantinga’s Free Will Defense
Plantinga’s free will defense aims to offer a positive argument that (1) is in 
fact consistent with (2). “One way to show that a proposition p is consistent 
with a proposition q,” Plantinga notes, “is to produce a third proposition r 
whose conjunction with p is consistent and entails q.” “r”, he points out, 
“need not be true or known to be true; it need not be so much as plausible. 
All that is required of it is that it be consistent with p, and in conjunction 
with the latter entail q.”5 The aim of the free will defense is to find such a 
proposition with respect to (1) and (2), thereby showing that these proposi-
tions are consistent with one another. Plantinga does this by arguing that 
it is possible that
(3) God is omnipotent and it was not within his power to create a 
world containing moral good but no moral evil.6
If (3) is possible, then it seems that so is the conjunction of (3) with
(4) God actualizes a world containing moral good.
Clearly, if the conjunction of (3) and (4) is possible, then so is the con-
junction of (1), (3) and (4).7 But obviously, the conjunction of (1), (3) and 
4Sometimes I will use “evil” as if it were a count noun (e.g., speaking of there being vari-
ous evils), sometimes as a mass noun (e.g., speaking of there being some evil in the world) 
and sometimes as though “evil” picked out a type of which there are instances (e.g., speak-
ing of there being instances of evil). I hope the reader will not find this stylistic variation too 
distracting.
5Plantinga, Nature of Necessity, 165.
6See Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 45, and Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, 184. 
7See Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 54–55, and Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, 189. 
Plantinga simply takes it as intuitively evident that if (3) is possible then so is the conjunction 
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(4) entails (2). So if the conjunction of (3) and (4) is possible, (1) is in fact 
consistent with (2).
The main task for the free will defender, then, is to argue that (3) is pos-
sible. Plantinga’s argument for the possibility of (3) depends upon two key 
premises. The first of these is that an agent’s acting freely is incompatible 
with her being causally determined so to act. The second is that for agents 
to perform morally good acts they must (on some occasion or another) be 
“significantly free.” That is, they must be such that on some occasions there 
are actions that are morally significant for them with respect to which they 
are free (where “an action is morally significant, for a given person at a given 
time, if it would be wrong for him to perform the action then but right to 
refrain, or vice versa”). If both of these premises hold, then not even God 
could causally secure that there are agents who perform morally good acts 
but always refrain from performing morally bad acts.8
As Plantinga observes, however, establishing that not even God could 
causally secure that there are agents who perform morally good acts but 
always refrain from performing morally bad acts is not sufficient for estab-
lishing that (3) is possible. It may be that even though God could not have 
causally secured such an outcome, he could have secured it in some other 
way. He might have been able to do so, for instance, if he had knowledge 
of various counterfactual (or subjunctive) conditionals concerning what 
the creatures he could create would freely do in various non-determining 
circumstances were he to create them and place them in those circum-
stances. If God did have knowledge of such counterfactuals of freedom, 
then one way in which he might have secured this outcome is by creat-
ing only those creatures he knows would never freely go wrong (in any 
circumstances in which he might place them). Another is by placing his 
creatures only in those circumstances in which he knows they would not 
freely go wrong (rather than in circumstances in which they would go 
wrong). Given the truth of incompatibilism, God could not have (to em-
ploy another one of Plantinga’s distinctions) strongly brought it about that 
there are significantly free creatures who never go wrong (i.e., he could 
not have causally secured such an outcome). However, possibly it was 
within God’s power that he weakly bring it about that this is the case (i.e., 
possibly it was within his power to strongly bring about certain states of 
affairs that are such that, were he to bring them about, there would be 
significantly free creatures who never go wrong).9
of (1), (3) and (4). As Thomas Flint pointed out to me, however, perhaps this claim could be 
rationally denied. One might think that if (3) were true, God would be morally obliged not to 
actualize a world containing moral good, given the fact that such a world would be marred 
by evil. I confess that, while I share Plantinga’s intuitions on this point, I do not know how 
to persuade someone who doesn’t. For present purposes, I will be content, in this paper, 
with merely establishing the following conditional claim: If Plantinga’s free will defense 
is successful and it is possible that God has middle knowledge, then it is also possible that, 
though God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good, there is non-moral evil.
8See Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 29–30, and Plantinga, Nature of Necessity, 165–167. 
9Plantinga, Nature of Necessity, 172–173. 
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Surely the atheologian is right to insist that if God has knowledge of the 
sort described above, it is at least broadly logically possible that it was within 
God’s power to weakly bring it about that there is moral good without 
bringing it about that there is moral evil.10 But in order to show that the 
free will defense fails, the atheologian needs something much stronger 
than a mere possibility claim. She needs the claim that it is a necessary 
truth that if God exists it is within his power to weakly bring it about that 
there is moral good but no moral evil. And this stronger claim, Plantinga 
contends, is simply false.
It is at least broadly logically possible, Plantinga argues, that every crea-
ture is such that, were God to create that creature and to grant it significant 
freedom, it would perform a morally bad action on at least one occasion, 
regardless of what other states of affairs (within God’s power to actualize) 
God were to bring about. Or, more generally, since we are discussing God’s 
decisions regarding whether or not to create creatures that he might not 
have brought into existence, it is at least possible that every creaturely in-
dividual essence is such that, were God to cause that essence to be instan-
tiated and to grant its instantiation significant freedom, its instantiation 
would perform a morally bad action on at least one occasion, regardless of 
what other states of affairs (within God’s power to actualize) God were to 
bring about.11 Plantinga describes this unfortunate state of affairs as one 
in which all creaturely essences are “transworldly depraved.”12 If, in fact, it 
is possible that all creaturely essences are transwordly depraved, then it is 
possible that it was not within God’s power to actualize a world containing 
moral good without also actualizing a world containing moral evil.13
10I’m taking it for granted that omniscience entails knowledge of all truths. But some 
philosophers have denied this. See: William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cor-
nell University Press, 1989), 53–54, 187–188; Richard Swinburne, The Christian God (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 130–134; and Peter van Inwagen, “What Does an Om-
niscient Being Know About the Future?” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, vol. 1, ed. 
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 216–230. Suppose, contrary 
to what I’ve been taking for granted, there are true counterfactuals of freedom but God 
(though omniscient) does not know them. Then it may be that it is within God’s power to 
do something, such that were he to do it, he would have managed to create significantly 
free creatures who never go wrong, even though he does not know this to be the case. 
Nevertheless, under such circumstances, God could hardly be blamed if he failed to create 
significantly free creatures who never go wrong since (through no fault of his own) he did 
not know how to bring about that outcome. His failure to bring about that outcome under 
such conditions would not impugn his perfect goodness. Therefore, the atheologian’s ob-
jection requires the claim that if God is omniscient, he knows all true counterfactuals of 
creaturely freedom.
11For a discussion of the notion of an individual essence being employed by Plantinga 
here, see Plantinga, Nature of Necessity, chap. 5. 
12The characterization of transworld depravity that I have provided here is rough and 
ready. See Plantinga, Nature of Necessity, 188, for Plantinga’s original attempt at a precise 
formulation of what it is for an individual essence to be transworldly depraved. See Alvin 
Plantinga, “Transworld Depravity, Transworld Sanctity, and Uncooperative Essences,” Phi-
losophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2009): 178–191, for a discussion of some needed 
refinements. 
13See Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 53, and Plantinga, Nature of Necessity, 188–189.
NON-MORAL EVIL AND THE FREE WILL DEFENSE 375
II. The Problem of Non-Moral Evil
Suppose the free will defense does in fact succeed in showing there is no 
logical inconsistency between (1) and (2). That does not suffice to show 
that (1) is consistent with there being evil of any sort. Plantinga’s free will 
defense, if successful, shows that there is no inconsistency between (1) 
and the claim that there is moral evil in the world. But one might still 
wonder whether (1) is consistent with the obtaining of morally bad states 
of affairs for which no moral agent (other than God himself perhaps) is 
responsible. That is, we might wonder whether (1) is consistent with there 
being non-moral evil in the world.
As Plantinga himself points out, we might ask “What about natural 
evil? Evil that cannot be ascribed to the free actions of human beings? 
Suffering due to earthquakes, disease and the like? Is the existence of evil 
of this sort compatible with (1)?”14 Plantinga’s response to these questions 
is that it is at least broadly logically possible that all natural evil is brought 
about by demons. If that possibility obtains, then natural evil is really just 
a kind of moral evil. And the free will defense goes on as before.15 Since 
what Plantinga is after is merely to show that (1) is consistent with there 
being natural evils, it does not matter whether the proposition that all 
natural evil is brought about by demons is a plausible one, provided that 
it is in fact broadly logically possible.
This response is certainly fine as far as it goes. But the atheologian might 
press further. She might point out that many of us (theists and non-theists 
alike) do in fact believe that there are instances of natural evil for which no 
moral agents (other than God perhaps) are responsible. Many of us believe, 
for example, that on some occasions, animals have suffered on account of 
predation, natural disasters and the like (perhaps millions of years before 
humans came on the scene). Many of us also believe that the suffering 
of sentient creatures is intrinsically morally bad. And while it is certainly 
broadly logically possible that moral agents (other than God) are respon-
sible for all such states of affairs, many of us believe that this is not in fact 
the case. That is, many of us (including those of us who are theists) believe
(5) There is non-moral evil in the world.
And the free will defense does not show that (1) and (5) are consistent 
with one another.
Here it is open to those who believe both (1) and (5) to go entirely on 
the defensive. They might point out that a simple assertion on the part 
of the atheologian that (1) and (5) are inconsistent does not amount to an 
argument that they are. They might simply stand back and insist that she 
provide them with such an argument before they concede that their belief 
in the conjunction of (1) and (5) is inconsistent. But it would be nice if they 
14Plantinga, Nature of Necessity, 191. 
15See Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 57–59, and Plantinga, Nature of Necessity, 191–193. 
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could do better than this. It would be nice if they had available to them a 
positive argument for the conclusion that (1) and (5) are consistent.16
There are, as Plantinga himself points out, other things that might be 
said about why God permits natural evils. As he notes, one might take 
a line along that of John Hick’s “soul-making theodicy” by noting that 
“some people deal creatively with certain kinds of hardship or suffer-
ing, so acting that on balance the whole state of affairs is valuable.”17 One 
might also attempt, along the lines of Richard Swinburne, to argue that 
familiarity with natural evil is a necessary condition for having the kind 
of knowledge required for being free with respect to a variety of morally 
significant acts.18 Or one might take a line like that advocated by David 
O’Connor, according to which having certain proclivities toward choos-
ing possible evils is a necessary condition for “morally creditable free 
choice” and that the having of such proclivities is itself a natural evil.19 If 
any of these strategies are successful, they might afford a way of extend-
ing the free will defense so as to argue for the consistency of (1) and (5).
I will not attempt to evaluate the success of these proposals, however. 
Instead I will note that even if the atheologian were to grant their success, 
there is a further kind of retreat available to her. She might point out that 
many of us believe that there are non-moral evils that bear no relevant 
logical or causal connection to morally significant acts on the part of free 
beings. Many of us (including theists) believe, for example, that there have 
been instances of animal suffering of which no moral agents (other than 
God) are aware, instances which are not logically necessary for any sort 
of morally valuable choice and which bear no direct causal relation to the 
activities of moral agents.20 Call evils of this sort “remote non-moral evils.” 
Even if the atheologian grants the success of one or more of the proposals 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, she might still accuse those theists 
who believe in the existence of remote non-moral evils of having inconsis-
tent beliefs. In the remainder of this paper I will present an argument for 
the consistency of (1) and (5) that blocks this sort of retreat on the part of 
the atheologian (in that it will be easy to see how the same defense could 
be applied both to remote and non-remote non-moral evils).
16There are other ways that a theist might respond to arguments from non-moral evil. 
Rather than attempting to argue positively for the joint possibility of (1) and (5), she might, 
for example, try telling a story that, for all we know, is true (but which also, for all we know, 
might well be necessarily false) which clearly entails the joint possibility of (1) and (5). For 
an example of such a strategy applied to the problem of animal suffering in the distant past, 
see van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), chap. 7.
17Plantinga, Nature of Necessity, 191–192.
18Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 247–256.
19David O’Connor, “A Variation on the Free Will Defense,” Faith and Philosophy 4 (1987): 
160–167. 
20William L. Rowe (“The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” American Phil-
osophical Quarterly 16 [1979]: 335–341) famously invokes a case of this sort in presenting an 
evidential argument from evil against the existence of God.
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By way of setup for what follows, recall from Section I that one objec-
tion to the free will defense, put forward on behalf of the atheologian, was 
that although God could not strongly bring it about (i.e., causally secure) 
that there are significantly free creatures who never go wrong, he might 
still have been able to weakly bring that about (i.e., he might have strongly 
brought it about that certain states of affairs obtain which are such that 
were he to bring them about, there would be significantly free creatures 
who never go wrong). This objection on behalf of the atheologian pre-
supposes that (possibly) God has knowledge of various contingent 
counterfactuals pertaining to free creaturely actions, counterfactuals 
which are not within his control, but which are useful for guiding his 
actions, prior even to his choice to create free creatures.21 That is, the 
objection presupposes that God has what contemporary philosophers 
of religion (following Luis de Molina) have come to call “middle 
knowledge.”22 In the dialectical context in which the free will defense 
is given, the possibility that God has middle knowledge is granted as a 
concession to the atheologian.23 It is a concession, however, that affords 
the free will defender resources of her own.
As I will argue in the following sections, if Plantinga’s free will defense 
is successful and it is possible that God has middle knowledge, then it 
is also possible that it was not within God’s power to actualize a world 
containing moral good without actualizing a world containing non-moral 
evil. My argument for this conclusion will turn on the claim that if it is 
possible that God has middle knowledge, it is also possible that there are 
various bizarre counterfactual connections, outside of God’s control, that 
link the performance of morally good actions with states of affairs that 
are intuitively irrelevant to the performance of those actions. In the next 
section, I provide an argument for this claim.
III. Middle Knowledge and the  
Possibility of Bizarre Counterfactual Connections
Suppose that God does have middle knowledge. For the purposes of 
illustrating what God’s having such knowledge might involve, let us 
adopt Plantinga’s example of Curley Smith, the mayor of Boston, who (in 
21See note 10 for further discussion concerning this point.
22“Middle knowledge” is so called because, if God has it, it is logically prior to God’s 
knowledge of what is actual but logically posterior to God’s knowledge of all possibilities; 
it is, so to speak, “in the middle” of these other two kinds of divine knowledge. See Alfred J. 
Freddoso, Luis de Molina: On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), for an English translation of Molina’s classic exposition of the doc-
trine of middle knowledge. See Thomas P. Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), for what is widely regarded as a definitive contem-
porary philosophical exposition of the doctrine.
23See Alvin Plantinga, “Replies to My Colleagues,” in Alvin Plantinga, ed. James E. 
Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985), 379; and 
Plantinga, “Transworld Depravity, Transworld Sanctity, and Uncooperative Essences,” 
186n6.
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“the fine old traditions of Bay State politics”) freely accepts a $35,000 bribe 
to go along with a proposed freeway construction project.24 If God has 
middle knowledge, then God knew, prior to Curley’s action, in what com-
plete, non-determining circumstances Curley would and would not have 
freely accepted the bribe.25 Furthermore, since these truths of which God 
has knowledge pertain to how Curley would freely act, it was not within 
God’s power to render them false.26
Now consider the complete non-determining circumstance in which 
Curley did in fact freely accept the bribe. Since this circumstance is com-
plete, presumably it includes the entirety of the (hard) past up to the 
moment of Curley’s action. And presumably God knows that if certain 
aspects of the past had been different (say, the nature of Curley’s upbring-
ing) and Curley were offered the bribe, he would have freely refused. It 
is interesting to ask just which elements of the past, had they been other-
wise, might have made such a difference in Curley’s behavior.
Suppose, for example, that centuries before Curley’s birth, on February 
14, 44 BC, Julius Caesar barely evaded stubbing his toe by noticing a stone 
in his path just in time. Then the complete circumstance in which Curley 
accepts the bribe includes the fact that this toe-stubbing evasion occurred. 
We might ask, “What would have happened if Caesar had stubbed his 
toe on that date?” Perhaps not much would have been different. Perhaps 
Curley would have been born as he in fact was and would have kept up 
the fine traditions of Bay State politics just as he in fact did. But it is also at 
least conceivable (especially if those who talk about phenomena such as 
“the butterfly effect” are to be believed) that had Caesar stubbed his toe, 
the entire history of the world after that point would have been radically 
different, that Curley would have never been born and that Bay State poli-
tics would have been a shining beacon of honesty and integrity within 
governmental administration.27
Let’s restrict our attention, however, to a case where this latter sort of 
possibility does not obtain. Consider a world, W, which shares an identical 
history with our own up to the time that Caesar narrowly evaded stub-
bing his toe, but suppose that Caesar did stub his toe in W. Suppose also, 
however, that what David Lewis called a “convergence miracle” occurred 
in W,28 one that washed out all of the causal traces of Caesar’s toe stubbing 
24Plantinga, Nature of Necessity, 173–174. 
25Here I am adopting the notion of completeness employed by Flint (Divine Providence: 
The Molinist Account, 47). According to Flint, a complete antecedent “includ[es] all of the 
prior causal activity of all agents along with all of the simultaneous causal activity by all 
agents other than the agent the counterfactual is about.” 
26Given, at least, that the antecedents of these counterfactuals are complete.
27For a classic science fiction short story that exploits this sort of possibility, see Ray 
Bradbury, “A Sound of Thunder,” originally published in Collier’s Weekly (1952). Reprinted 
in The Best Time Travel Stories of the 20th Century, ed. Harry Turtledove and Martin H. Green-
berg. (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005), 75–86. 
28David Lewis, “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow,” Nous 13 (1979): 455–476.
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and brought the history of W back in line with our own, up to the time just 
prior to when Curley has the choice to accept the bribe. What would Curley 
have done had the history of the world up to the time of his acceptance 
been the same as it is in W rather than as it actually is? There’s a strong 
temptation to say that it would have made no difference, that Curley would 
have accepted the bribe regardless. As I will argue in this section, how-
ever, this is a temptation we should resist. We should acknowledge that 
it is at least broadly logically possible that though Curley would have ac-
cepted the bribe under the conditions that actually obtained, Curley would 
have broken with Bay State tradition in this alternative circumstance and 
refused the bribe.
Let “C” denote the state of affairs including all and only those portions 
of the history of the world that the actual world and W share in common 
up to the moment that Curley accepts the bribe. C will include almost 
everything that the complete, non-determining circumstance in which 
Curley actually accepts the bribe includes, absent those states of affairs 
that entail that Caesar did not stub his toe on February 14, 44 BC (and that 
there was no subsequent convergence miracle, etc.). Now consider the fol-
lowing bizarre conjunction of counterfactual conditionals:
Bizarre: If Caesar had stubbed his toe on February 14, 44 BC and C had been 
actual, Curley would have freely refused the bribe. But, if Caesar had not 
stubbed his toe on February 14, 44 BC and C had been actual, Curley would 
not have freely refused the bribe.
I contend that (given the supposition that God has middle knowledge) we 
ought to accept that it is at least broadly logically possible that proposi-
tions like Bizarre are true.29 I offer three lines of support for this claim.
The first line of support adopts an argument that has recently been 
put forward by Dean Zimmerman for the conclusion that proponents of 
middle knowledge ought to acknowledge the possibility of there being 
bizarre counterfactual connections between free creaturely actions and 
intuitively irrelevant states of affairs (such as the quantum states of fun-
damental particles in distant galaxies and the like). Zimmerman notes 
that if there are true counterfactuals of freedom, of use to God in his prov-
idential decision making, then the truth of these counterfactuals is not 
grounded in the ways that the truth of other counterfactuals is plausibly 
said to be. As Zimmerman points out, since the relevant counterfactuals 
here are counterfactuals of freedom (and we are assuming that free will is 
incompatible with determinism), the conditions specified in their ante-
cedents are not logically, causally or nomologically sufficient for the truth 
of their consequents. Furthermore, he notes, the truth of these counterfac-
tuals is not underwritten by similarity relations between worlds that are 
29Flint (Divine Providence: The Molinist Account, 207–209, 248–249) seems to take it for 
granted that advocates of the doctrine of middle knowledge are committed to the possibil-
ity of there being bizarre counterfactual connections of this sort.
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prior to their truth. Rather, their truth is simply brute.30 But if their truth 
is simply brute, what necessitates that pairs of counterfactuals of freedom 
that have the same consequent but whose antecedents differ only with 
respect to matters that are intuitively irrelevant to an agent’s choice must 
have the same truth values? If the truth of these counterfactuals is brute, 
Zimmerman argues, we should concede that it could simply turn out that 
some such pairs differ in their truth values.31 If Zimmerman is right about 
this, then it is least possible that If Caesar had stubbed his toe on February 14, 
44 BC and C had been actual, Curley would have freely refused the bribe is true 
but If Caesar had not stubbed his toe on February 14, 44 BC and C had been ac-
tual, Curley would have freely refused the bribe is false. And if that is so, then 
it is at least possible that the conjuncts of Bizarre are both true.32
Aaron Segal has suggested to me (in conversation) another argument 
for the claim that it is possible for propositions like Bizarre to be true. Con-
sider Peter van Inwagen’s useful thought experiment in which we imagine 
an agent making a free choice, God’s subsequently resetting the state of the 
universe to how things were just prior to the agent’s making that choice, 
and then God’s repeating this procedure multiple times.33 Suppose we 
imagine this happening to Curley just after he freely chooses to accept the 
bribe. What should we expect to happen in this scenario? As van Inwagen’s 
discussion suggests, given that free will is incompatible with determin-
ism, it is at least broadly logically possible that on some repetitions Curley 
freely accepts the bribe while on others he freely refuses.34 Furthermore, 
it is at least possible (though perhaps not probable) that, by sheer coinci-
dence, some strange patterns would emerge. Imagine each repetition as 
being numbered sequentially. It might just so happen that Curley always 
freely refuses the bribe on prime numbered repetitions but always freely 
accepts it on composite numbered repetitions. Or it might be that Curley’s 
refusals fall exactly along a Fibonacci sequence. And so on.
Now we need only to imagine a “transworld” version of our van-Inwagen 
-inspired thought experiment. We imagine each “repetition” occurring 
30Here we can construe the term “brute” liberally enough so that certain ways of main-
taining that counterfactuals of freedom are trivially grounded are compatible with their 
being “brute.” For instance, we can take Plantinga’s (“Replies to My Colleagues,” 374) off-
hand suggestion that “what grounds the truth of the counterfactual [concerning Curley’s 
taking the bribe] . . . is just that in fact Curley is such that if he had been offered a $35,000 
bribe, he would have freely taken it” as compatible with that counterfactual’s being brute.
31Dean Zimmerman, “Yet Another Anti-Molinist Argument,” in Metaphysics and the 
Good: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams, ed. Samuel Newlands (New 
York: Oxford University Press 2009), 33–94. I am indebted to Aaron Segal for the manner in 
which I have summarized Zimmerman’s argument.
32I am assuming here that necessarily, either If Caesar had not stubbed his toe on February 
14, 44 BC and C had been actual, Curley would have freely refused the bribe is true or If Caesar 
had not stubbed his toe on February 14, 44 BC and C had been actual, Curley would not have freely 
refused the bribe is true.
33Peter van Inwagen, “Free Will Remains a Mystery,” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 
ed. Robert Kane (New York: Oxford University Press 2002), 171–172. 
34Ibid. 
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not on different occasions after God has reset the state of the universe 
but in different nearby possible worlds. For definiteness, suppose that we 
consider only those nearby worlds in which Curley finds himself in cir-
cumstances very much like C (differing, perhaps, in minor manners that 
are intuitively irrelevant to Curley’s choice, such as the states of electrons 
in distant galaxies and the like). By analogy to the original thought experi-
ment, we should grant that possibly, in some of these worlds, Curley freely 
accepts the bribe while in others he freely refuses. Likewise, we should 
believe that it is at least possible that, by sheer coincidence, odd correla-
tions show up in the pattern of Curley’s refusals and denials that we find 
across these worlds. And it might just so happen that these correlations 
are such that Bizarre comes out true.
I’ll close this section with one final argument for the conclusion that 
it is possible for propositions like Bizarre to be true. Suppose we endorse 
a version of the consequence argument for the conclusion that free will 
is incompatible with determinism. Let “C1” denote a state of affairs that 
results when C is completed (in such a way that it constitutes a complete, 
non-determining circumstance) by adding that Caesar stubbed his toe on 
February 14, 44 BC (and any other omitted details) and let “C2” denote a 
state of affairs that results when C is completed by adding that Caesar did 
not stub his toe on that date.35 If we let “R” denote the proposition that 
Curley freely refuses the bribe, then what affirming the possibility of Bizarre 
amounts to is affirming that it is possible that C1 □→ R is true but C2 □→ R 
is false. So denying the possibility of Bizarre commits us to denying that it 
is possible that C1 □→ R is true but C2 □→ R is false. That is, denying the 
possibility of Bizarre commits us to the following claim:
(6) □((C1 □→ R) → (C2 □→ R)).
Now suppose that C2 obtains, that Curley has no choice about this36 and 
also that C1 □→ R is true. Then C1 □→ R has a false antecedent. And while 
it seems right to affirm that Curley has (or has had) a choice about the 
truth value of many counterfactuals of freedom pertaining to him (those 
that happen to have true antecedents), it also seems right to affirm that 
Curley doesn’t have (and never has had) a choice about the truth values 
of many of those true counterfactuals of freedom pertaining to him that 
have false antecedents (since he has never had the opportunity to act in 
such a way that would directly falsify them, that is, falsify them by ren-
dering their consequent false when their antecedent is true). Plausibly, 
then, it is at least possible that Curley does not have (and never had) a 
35Sometimes I will use these names to denote states of affairs and sometimes I will use 
them to denote the propositions that those states of affairs obtain. Context should make it 
clear which is intended. 
36In an ordinary situation of this sort, much of the past that is included in C2 would 
include Curley’s free choices as well as items shaped by those choices. But, for present 
purposes, we may artificially stipulate that this is the occasion of Curley’s first free choice. 
(Thanks to Patrick Todd for noticing the need for this stipulation.)
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choice about the fact that C1 □→ R is true. But if that is so, then it also 
seems at least possible that
(7) NCurley(C2&(C1 □→ R)) (where “NCurley(p)” is to be understood as “p and 
Curley doesn’t have and never had a choice about whether p”).
It is also true, however, that (6) entails
(8) □((C2 &(C1 □→ R)) → R).
And, by a standard beta-like principle,37 we can infer from (7) and (8) that
(9) NCurley(R).
But since R is a proposition that entails that Curley freely refuses the bribe, 
(9) cannot be true. Something above has to give. It seems plausible that 
what ought to give is our denial that Bizarre is possibly true.38
Each of the above arguments (though perhaps not irresistible) is per-
suasive on its own. Together, they make for a powerful cumulative case 
that (provided it is possible that God has middle knowledge) it is possible 
for propositions like Bizarre to be true. As I will explain in the next sec-
tion, this possibility opens up a way of extending Plantinga’s free will 
defense to provide us with a positive argument that the claim that God’s 
being omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good is consistent with there 
being non-moral evil.
IV. Extending the Free Will Defense
Suppose Bizarre is true and suppose, furthermore, that the counterfactual 
conditionals that are the conjuncts of Bizarre are among those whose truth 
values are outside of God’s control.39 If so, there is an interesting limita-
tion on God’s power. God is not able to bring it about that C is actual and 
Curley freely refuses the bribe without also (at least weakly) bringing it 
about that Caesar stubs his toe on February 14, 44 BC. Perhaps Caesar’s 
stubbing his toe is not a clear example of a non-moral evil (perhaps Caesar 
was being carelessly irresponsible with his toe at the time). But, of course, 
there is nothing special about this particular example. It could just as well 
37We can make the inference that follows by employing an individualized version of the 
following inference rule (which Finch and Warfield have labeled “Beta 2”): (Np & □(p → q)) 
implies Nq. See Alicia Finch and Ted A.Warfield, “The Mind Argument and Libertarian-
ism,” Mind 107 (1998): 515–528.
38I do not claim that this argument should rationally compel someone who is dead set 
on denying the possibility of Bizarre to change her mind. She might rationally deny the 
possibility of (7) instead (by maintaining that necessarily Curley does have a choice about 
whether C1 □→ R in the given circumstances). I do claim that the premises on which this 
argument relies are plausible and that they give someone who is neutral concerning the 
possibility of Bizarre a reason to affirm that it is possible.
39Given that God has middle knowledge, it is sufficient for these conditionals being out-
side of God’s control that every way of completing their antecedents (so that the circum-
stance they describe is one that is complete and non-determining) is such that the resulting 
conditionals are both true. If any of my arguments in the previous section for the conclu-
sion that Bizarre is possible are sound, then it is possible that this is the case. 
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have turned out that there is some circumstance C' (in which God is able 
to place Curley) such that God cannot bring it about that C' is actual and 
Curley freely refuses the bribe (though Curley is free to do so in C') with-
out also bringing it about that some specific instance of non-moral evil ob-
tains (though C' itself includes no such instances). It may be, for example, 
that God is not able to bring it about that C' is actual and Curley freely 
refuses the bribe without permitting a certain deer to suffer minor back 
pain (back pain that does not result from the activities of any moral agent) 
on some occasion in the distant past.
In fact, it might just have turned out that for any circumstance, C*, God 
is not able to bring it about that C* is actual and Curley freely refuses the 
bribe without also bringing it about that some instance of non-moral evil 
obtains. And, of course, there is nothing special, on this score, about Cur-
ley’s choice whether to accept the bribe. Indeed, it might have been that 
for every circumstance, C*, God is not able to bring it about that C* is ac-
tual and that Curley freely does something morally good without God’s also 
bringing it about that some instance of non-moral evil obtains. Were this 
so, God would not be able to bring it about that the instantiation of Curley’s 
essence freely does something morally good without also bringing it about 
that there is at least one instance of non-moral evil. Let us say that if Curley’s 
essence is in this condition, it is “transworldly non-morally depraved.”
Given that God does have middle knowledge, it is possible that not 
only Curley’s essence, but all creaturely essences are transworldly non-
morally depraved. If things had turned out that way, then God would not 
have been able to bring it about that some creatures freely perform mor-
ally good actions without also bringing it about that there is some non-
moral evil in the world. And so, given all of the above, it is possible that
(10) God is omnipotent and it was not within his power to create a 
world containing moral good but no non-moral evil.
Clearly, if the conjunction of (4) and (10) is possible, so is the conjunction of 
(1), (4) and (10). But obviously, the conjunction of (1), (4) and (10) entails (5). 
So if the conjunction of (4) and (10) is possible, (1) is in fact consistent with 
(5). It is intuitively evident that if (10) is possible, then so is the conjunction 
of (4) and (10).40 And above we have an argument for the conclusion that 
(10) is possible. Thus, we have a positive argument for the conclusion that 
(1) and (5) are consistent. Here we have our desired extension of the free 
will defense.41
40I take the claim that if (10) is possible then so is the conjunction of (1), (4) and (10) to 
be intuitively evident in the same way that Plantinga takes as intuitively evident the claim 
that if (3) is possible then so is the conjunction of (1), (3) and (4). (See note 7 on this point). At 
the very least, it seems that we ought to endorse the following material conditional: If the 
conjunction of (1), (3) and (4) is possible, then so is the conjunction of (1), (4) and (10) (pro-
vided (10) is possible). What plausible reason could one have for affirming the antecedent 
of this conditional but denying its consequent?
41Upon completing an initial draft of this paper, I discovered that Robert M. Adams 
(“Plantinga on the Problem of Evil,” in Tomberlin and van Inwagen, Alvin Plantinga, 236) 
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I believe that the above argument provides us with a strong case for 
the conclusion that (1) and (5) are consistent. However, I would be remiss 
if I did not mention that there is one respect in which this extension of 
Plantinga’s free will defense is dialectically weaker than the original. As 
already noted, as far as Plantinga’s original free will defense is concerned, 
the claim that God has middle knowledge is granted as a concession to the 
atheologian. While Plantinga himself believes that God does have such 
knowledge, he does not need to invoke that claim as a premise in his argu-
ment. He could just as well have evaded the atheologian’s objections by 
simply arguing for the conditional claim that if God has knowledge of 
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, it is nevertheless still possible that 
it is not within his power to bring it about that there is moral good but no 
moral evil. Not so when it comes to the extension of the free will defense 
offered above. The above extension crucially relies on the premise that 
possibly God does have middle knowledge. And the claim that it is pos-
sible for a being to have middle knowledge is a highly contentious one.42
Nevertheless, many theists do believe that God has middle knowledge, 
and this claim has been defended by a number of able philosophers.43 Fur-
thermore, at the very least, the availability of the above extension of the free 
will defense places a further burden of proof on the atheologian who would 
put forward a logical argument from non-moral evil. I conclude, therefore, 
that the availability of the above defense affords theists with a promising 
way of resisting certain kinds of arguments from non-moral evil.44
University of Notre Dame
makes (in passing) a similar suggestion concerning how, given the assumption that God 
has middle knowledge, Plantinga’s free will defense might be extended to accommodate 
the kinds and quantities of evil that actually occur, without appealing to the activities of 
demonic agents.
42For some arguments against this claim, see: Robert Adams, “An Anti-Molinist Argu-
ment,” Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 343–353; William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowl-
edge; and Peter van Inwagen, “Against Middle Knowledge,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 
21 (1997): 225–236.
43For some defenses of this claim, see: William Lane Craig, The Only Wise God: The 
Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book 
House, 1987); Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account; and Plantinga, “Replies to My 
Colleagues,” 373–378.
44For helpful comments and conversation, I would like to thank Sarah Boyce, Aaron Segal, 
Andrew Moon, Brandon Schmidly, Garrett Pendergraft, Justin McBrayer, Patrick Todd, 
Philip Swenson, Thomas Flint and the participants in Thomas Flint’s Spring 2010 seminar 
on divine providence held at the University of Notre Dame.
